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ABSTRACT
This special issue expands on the existing literature on the international dimen-
sion of democratization by focusing on democracy projection, defined as the 
projection of (democratic) norms in the every-day practice of interactions, beyond 
any donor-recipient relationship, between states and foreign civil society actors on 
issue areas where both have interests to defend. The SI examines the issue areas of 
trade, anti-corruption, applied research, gender and LGBTI, focusing on EU prac-
tices in its everyday dealings with civil society in the Southern Mediterranean. The 
authors conclude, based on comparative case studies relying on extensive inter-
views, direct observations and content analysis, that democracy projection varies 
according to four main factors: EU’s perceived interest, its ideational commitment 
to norms of dialogue and inclusion, the degree of institutional inertia and 
discourses/structures of meanings dominating in some policy areas which pre-
clude EU engagement on substance.
KEYWORDS Democracy projection; democracy promotion; practices; European Union; Southern 
Mediterranean
1. Introduction
In this special issue, we propose to expand on the existing literature on 
the international dimension of democratization, by focusing on what we 
call democracy projection. What we are concerned with is how powerful 
actors – and in this case the EU – engages with foreign – here Southern 
Mediterranean – civil society actors, including activist non-governmental 
organizations, religious groups, trade unions, researchers, and women. 
More specifically, we are interested in how they do so outside of the 
donor-recipient/project support relationship in which many of them are 
engaged. The starting point is a concern with whether the EU interacts 
with such actors, which are usually thought of as crucial for democratiza-
tion to take root, and whether it does so in a way that is actually 
conducive to democratization.
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This means that we focus on an aspect which is not currently given much 
attention in the literature on the international dimension of democratization. 
This literature, as will be further explained below, tends to focus either on 
active agency (democracy assistance, democratic conditionalities) or passive 
diffusion (through ‘contagion’, ‘emulation’, ‘policy transfer and learning’ or 
‘demonstration’ effects). What we aim to capture with the concept of democ-
racy projection lies somewhere in between: the search light is on EU practices 
in its everyday dealings with politically relevant groups such as activist NGOs, 
religious groups, researchers, women and so on, and whether such 
exchanges are marked by democratic norms. Thus, the interactions under 
examination are not those where the EU is pursuing specifically designed 
policies of democracy promotion per se, as is the case with its vast democracy 
assistance arsenal or its (considerably more sparingly applied) democratic 
conditionalities. Instead, we are looking at day-to-day interactions and prac-
tices in areas where the EU is pursuing a series of other goals, such as 
strengthening applied research across the Mediterranean, negotiating trade 
agreements and anti-corruption measures, working with/on women as 
a category important for the social stability and modernization of Southern 
Mediterranean countries etc. As has been noted elsewhere, states (and in this 
case the EU as an association of states) are at the present day dealing more 
extensively and directly with non-state actors active inside other states than 
was the case in the past (Grimm, 2019; Korosteleva, 2016). We are examining 
if, in those contexts, EU interaction with its interlocutors is based on demo-
cratic norms or not – i.e. whether and to what extent it is projecting demo-
cratic norms and practices.
The focus on direct interactions beyond the donor – recipient relationship 
also brings with it a concern with the ‘recipient’ side: democracy is in its very 
essence reciprocal, and an understanding of the extent to which EU relations 
with typical recipients of democracy assistance also outside the strict donor – 
recipient relationship has democratic characteristics will necessarily imply 
examining the agency of the ‘recipient’/target side of democracy assistance 
and democracy promotion efforts writ large. Thus, instead of studying solely 
the EU and EU member state policies, agencies, and programmes, the focus is 
also on recipient institutions and organizations and how they interact – in 
various ways, with various aims and effects – with EU policy making, both in 
terms of the democratization agenda and beyond. Similarly, some of the 
contributions in this special issue pay attention to how non state actors 
perceive the relations with EU institutions as they develop in practice.
It should emerge from the above that we are honing in on practices of 
interaction. By analysing EU practices of interaction with Southern Mediterranean 
non-state actors, we can learn about the norms and values (democratic or other-
wise) underpinning them. So here, we are interested in understanding if (and if so 
how) democracy is projected through the performance of everyday practices 
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which emerge out of specific contexts (Christensen, 2017; Korosteleva, 2016). In 
other words, we are asking: How and in what manner is the EU engaging with 
these Southern Mediterranean non-state actors? Are they included in consulta-
tions on EU – third country policy agendas in a wide variety of policy areas? If so, 
which actors are included/excluded and under what conditions? To what extent 
do the Southern Mediterranean non-state actors feel (dis-)empowered in and 
through their interactions with the EU? What kind of a say do they have in policy 
formulation in practice? Is the EU, through its practices, instrumentalizing these 
actors for its own purposes? These are the questions that guide this special issue at 
the empirical level.
Our focus on practices is obviously – if quite loosely – inspired by the 
practice turn in IR in recent years. The authors of this special issue examine 
practices – such as the selection of interlocutors by European External Action 
Service personnel – which are, on a deeper level linked to habits as a central 
part of the theorization of practice (Cornut, 2015; Hopf, 2010). Likewise, they 
de facto look at communities of practice (e.g., the EU civil service and EU 
diplomacy (Bicchi, 2011, Lequesne, 2017, pp. 14–15)). However, the goal of 
the authors of this special issue has not necessarily been to explore theore-
tically such habits or communities, and they have not been bound by any 
particular practice approach or framework. What they all have in common, 
instead, is going beyond studying formal institutions and elite discourses, 
instead focusing on ‘everyday agents’ and paying attention to routines and 
ways of doing that are quotidian. It is, in other words, a pragmatic focus on 
practices, defined simply in terms of ‘standard ways of doing’. Defining 
practices is the subject of longstanding debates (Schatzki, Adler and 
Pouliot, Adler-Nissen). Similarly to Bicchi and Bremberg (2016) we adopt 
a rather broad understanding of practices, which enables us to simply place 
the emphasis on practices ‘as the place to study human activity’.
This focus on practice obviously brings with it a strong empirical com-
mitment. The articles in this special issue have all adopted the case study 
approach (although in various guises such as comparative case studies and 
detailed single case studies). Methodologically, there is a wide diversity of 
approaches used to evaluate and analyse practices: “practices are ‘seen’ 
(e.g., ethnography, participant observation), ‘talked about’ (interviews) or 
‘read’ (textual/discourse analysis)’ (Adler-Nissen, 2016). It can be about 
interaction or performance of practices. This diversity is reflected in this 
special issue, where the articles by Anna Khakee and Ragnar Weilandt and 
by Esra LaGro and Hakan Cavlak rely to a large extent on interviews, 
whereas, in addition to interviews, Ragnar Weilandt uses direct observation 
of consultation meetings in Tunisia in his article. Assem Dandashly relies on 
a combination of interviews and observations of day-to-day interactions 
between the EU and LGBTI groups and, finally, the article by Sarah Wolff 
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relies on content analysis. So, as just stated, our approach is strongly 
anchored in empirical analysis.
However, in addition to the empirical commitment, we also aim to add to 
the conceptualization of the international dimension of democratization, 
even if in a modest way, given that we are here restricting our analysis to 
the EU and practices in the Mediterranean region. Thus, we argue for the 
usefulness of adding the concept of democracy projection to the theoretical 
toolbox for the analysis of the external dimension of democratization. As will 
be further discussed below, we define democracy projection as the projection 
of (democratic) norms in the every-day practice of interactions, beyond any 
donor-recipient relationship, between states and foreign civil society actors on 
issue areas where both have interests to defend.
In policy terms, an approach focusing on relations between powerful 
state actors and civil society1 is particularly important at the current 
juncture, globally and in the southern Mediterranean in particular. We 
have witnessed several waves of citizens’ mobilization seeking more active 
participation in democratic processes. Anti-austerity and anti-authoritarian 
movements and uprisings in the streets of Athens, Algiers, Beirut, Cairo, 
London and Minsk have been found to reject representative democracy in 
favour of a more participative understanding of what democracy means 
(Ishkanian & Glasius, 2017, p. 1006). Common across the ‘square move-
ments’ in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa is the call for 
‘active citizenship’ (ibid, 1007). These movements are contesting the 
traditional engagement of would-be democracy promoters with states 
institutions and long-established civil society organizations (CSOs). They 
push for a broader understanding of what citizens’ participation in 
a democracy means. This should lead to a reconceptualization of demo-
cratization and, importantly for this special issue, of relations between the 
EU and politically relevant actors in the southern Neighbourhood states.
This introductory chapter is of the Special Issue divided into five subsec-
tions. After having set the scene in the introduction, section two defines the 
concept of democracy projection in more detail and sets out the argument 
for its usefulness. Section three aims to situate the notion in the literature 
on the external dimension of democratization. These two sections are 
followed by an overview of the special issue, covering both the depth and 
breadth of the research undertaken. The concluding section outlines the 
contributions of this special issue to scholarship, stressing that democracy 
projection varies according to four main factors: EU’s perceived interest to 
reinforce democracy agency, EU’s ideational commitment to the norms of 
dialogue, inclusion and mutuality, the degree of institutional inertia that can 
enhance or inhibit democracy projection and finally the meanings dominat-
ing some policy areas such as trade, which may also be a brake to real EU 
engagement on substance.
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2. Conceptualizing democracy projection
This SI examines how state actors that purportedly aim to defend and 
advance democracy abroad interact in practice with non-state actors in 
countries targeted by such democracy promotion efforts, outside the direct 
democracy promotion relationship. Unlike much of the existing literature on 
this topic, this issue hones in not on democracy assistance or democratic 
conditionalities (together usually referred to as democracy promotion – see 
further details below) per se, but on everyday interactions beyond direct 
democracy promotion between representatives of such state actors, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, faith-based groups, human rights NGOs, labour 
unions, local community groups, think tanks/academic institutions, women’s 
and youth associations, etc. in traditional ‘target’ countries. Thus, analytically, 
our aim is to add to the conceptual toolbox of the academic literature on the 
external dimension of democratization. We have labelled this new notion 
‘democracy projection’, as we wish to stress that it involves practices where 
states – often by habit or convention rather than by a conscious choice – 
project certain (democratic or non-democratic) norms in their day-to-day 
interactions with foreign non-state actors. Thus, in short, the democracy 
projection aspect of the external dimension of democratization can be 
defined as the projection of (democratic) norms in the every-day practice of 
interactions, beyond any donor-recipient relationship, between states and for-
eign civil society actors on issue areas where both have interests to defend.
We believe in the usefulness of the concept of democracy projection in 
understanding how and why democracy may – or may not – travel across 
borders: If the relations that the EU, in our case, entertains on a continuous 
basis with civil society actors in third countries are marked by norms of 
consultation, exchange, respect for difference and inclusivity this will, we 
presume, be beneficial for the democractic agency of such actors. If, on the 
other hand, interactions are based on top-down, exclusionary, or ‘token’ 
practices, the outcome will be that civil society actors will not be thus 
strengthened: it may even (though this would need further empirical inves-
tigation) lead to their weakening vis-a-vis national governments, as the latter 
may emulate their foreign counterparts in disregarding civil society actors.
It is important to stress that we are not arguing that democracy is always, 
or indeed as a rule, thus projected in day-to-day interactions between actors 
from states purportedly aiming to advance democracy abroad and non-state 
actors in ‘target’ countries. Rather, the goal of the various contributions to this 
Special Issue has been to examine this empirically, and our conclusions are, as 
will become clear in subsequent sections of this introduction, mixed. This, it 
should be noted, makes it similar to other concepts in the democratization 
toolbox. For instance, the extent of democratic diffusion/learning is uneven at 
best and depends on a variety of factors (for a review, see Åberg & Denk, 
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2020). Thus, in our view, the fact that democracy projection is sometimes 
present, and in other cases absent, adds to its analytical value, and the 
contributions to this SI are devoted to better understanding why and when 
this occurs.
3. Situating democracy projection
Conceptually, the notion of democracy projection is, as already noted, situ-
ated somewhere in between the ‘number of factors of the international 
context “without agency” that could positively influence democratization, 
i.e. all forms of imitation, contagion, [and] learning’, on the one hand, and 
‘all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indir-
ectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to 
contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, democratiza-
tion of autocratic regimes, or consolidation of democracy in specific recipient 
countries’, on the other (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999, 12).
The factors ‘without agency’ are widely discussed in the literature on the 
international dimension of democratization. They include diffusion, demon-
stration effects, contagion, emulation, and learning. This brief literature 
review cannot hope to do them justice in any way, not least since there is 
considerable disagreement on their definition: for instance, a recent article 
identified at least four different understandings of diffusion (Åberg & Denk, 
2020). The idea behind demonstration/emulation effects is, very crudely put, 
that the successful democratic transitions in neighbouring states or in ‘self- 
identified peers’ and the transmission of information influence elites in auto-
cratic states. Learning, in turn, can be achieved through transnational net-
works of various types (for an overview, see Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 38–9; 
Diamond, 2008).
Likewise, activities and measures ‘explicitly designed to contribute to . . . 
democratization’ – that is, democracy promotion – have garnered substantial 
attention over recent years. In line with commonly accepted definitions, 
democracy promotion is a usually operationalized to include both democracy 
assistance (i.e. foreign aid funding specifically aimed at building and strength-
ening those institutions and groups which are considered key for democracy 
to emerge/consolidate) and positive/negative conditionalities (foreign policy 
sticks such as ‘essential elements clauses’2 and carrots such as increased aid 
and closer economic ties, aimed at nudging states in a democratic direction) 
as well as public pronouncements in support of democratic actors and aims in 
third countries (Khakee, forthcoming). Such explicit democracy promotion 
policies have been a central aspect of European external relations since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Whether resisted, criticized, hailed as a mark of progress, 
or actively championed, politicians and scholars would agree on its signifi-
cance in shaping – directly or indirectly, advertently or inadvertently – 
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developments in Europe, its neighbourhood and beyond. Not surprisingly 
then, the democracy promotion agenda has received considerably scholarly 
attention. However, theorizing and conceptualization has, surprisingly, been 
rather limited (Smith, 2000). The focus of much of the academic literature on 
democracy promotion generally has been on policy effectiveness or what 
Milja Kurki has called ‘the “problem-solving” mainstream of democracy sup-
port analysis’ (Kurki, 2013, p. 215). Thus, scholarly inquiry has largely focused 
on the questions: ‘Does democracy assistance work?’; Do democratic con-
ditionalities work (K. E. Smith, 2015; Velluti, 2016)? ‘Why (not)?’ and ‘Can we 
make it work better?’ (see e.g., Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Youngs, 
2009).3
This ‘problem-solving’ focus of the EU democracy promotion literature is 
evident in the Mediterranean context as well. Academic writing has effec-
tively shadowed the evolution of EU policy making: every new policy initiative 
from the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s, via the Advanced Status of the 
2000s to the post-Arab Uprising ‘more for more’ principle has led to its crop of 
new policy papers, journal articles and books (see e.g., Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2005; Teti, 2012). In other words, academic output – and, it 
must be underlined, writings by several of us authors of this special issue are 
no exceptions in this regard – has tended to closely follow the output of EU 
institutions, thus reacting to new EU policy documents and initiatives, with-
out necessarily critically analysing them from a broader, more conceptual 
perspective. Here too, the ‘problem-solving’ character manifests itself in the 
conundrums tackled: how to better deal with Islamist political parties and civil 
society organizations (Pace & Wolff, 2017)? How can democracy promotion 
tackle crackdowns on civil society (Youngs & Echagüe, 2017)? Can democracy 
support be made more receptive to the needs and preferences on the 
recipient side? These are problems and hurdles faced by the democracy 
promoting practitioners in their work, and, again, exemplify the ‘problem- 
solving’ trend in academic texts.4 We argue in this special issue that it is 
important to take an analytical step back when it comes to understanding 
conceptually European democracy promotion. We do so by dissociating 
ourselves from the conceptual grids and policy classifications created by 
the European institutions and instead proposing the conceptualization of 
democracy projection which is anchored in practice.
So most of the literature has focused on better understanding the effec-
tiveness of traditional EU policies and instruments of democracy promotion 
such as for instance, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), political conditionality within the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), ENP sub-committees, ENP benchmarking procedures, and the 
like. In other words, democracy promotion has mostly been looked at from 
the perspective of EU policy. The approach remains Eurocentric and centred 
on policy, analysing mostly how the EU organizes the governance of 
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democracy promotion through instruments, agreements, action plans, pro-
gress reports etc. Only to a much lesser extent does it examine how the policy 
is implemented in practice, including at the level of the delegations and how 
it meshes – or not – with interactions between EU representatives and groups 
and individuals in recipient states in other issue areas.
It must be pointed out that, in the field of democracy promotion, some 
institutional practices have been analysed, in particular when it comes to the 
granting and disbursement of aid (Carapico, 2014). Academics have come to 
the conclusion that in spite of an increase in the number of EU actors involved 
in EU foreign policy towards Arab countries after the Uprisings and the reform 
and boosting of instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument (ENPI), practices have changed to a lesser extent. Democracy 
assistance is still disbursed predominantly to state institutions, even though 
NGOs receive a larger slice of the pie. There is an effort to be nimbler, with 
new institutions such as the European Endowment of Democracy granting 
aid using a ‘lighter’ set of practices and procedures (Leininger & Richter, 
2014). Thus, this means that, while funding practices are analysed, there is 
little understanding of practices beyond the recipient-donor relationship and 
what it entails in different policy areas, beyond pure democracy assistance 
programmes.
As noted, our goal is to bring more conceptual clarity to that area in between 
all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and implemented by 
foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to democratization, on the 
one hand, and the factors of the international context ‘without agency’’, on 
the other. As mentioned, we argue that it is important to examine the extent to 
which basic democratic norms infuse modes of EU direct interaction with 
politically relevant actors in the southern Neighbourhood in policy areas out-
side democracy promotion such as, in this special issue, anti-corruption, trade, 
social science research, gender, and LGBTI rights. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
(2011) touch upon this intermediate level with their theorizing around ‘func-
tional cooperation’. They argue that EU democratic principles are ‘embedded in 
the governance of individual policy fields’ such as the environment, trade, 
migration, security cooperation, fisheries, safety standards and competition 
policy (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 887). These democratic principles 
then unfold ‘through the deepening of transgovernmental, horizontal ties 
between the EU and third countries’ public administrations’ (ibid). In other 
words, the EU has built democratic governance (and in particular transparency, 
accountability and participation) into its regulatory framework and procedures. 
As and when these are exported as part of the acquis communautaire, demo-
cratic governance principles are included in the package. While this theory 
presumes inter alia that the acquis is democratic in character, the concept of 
democracy projection leaves this question to be settled by empirical investiga-
tion – as noted in the previous section, we do not postulate that democracy 
8 A. KHAKEE AND S. WOLFF
projection is always, or even mostly, present in interactions between the EU and 
non-state interlocutors in third countries. In other words, we shed the assump-
tion that the EU is necessarily a ‘force for good’ (Poli, 2016). Also, this theory to 
a certain extent conceives of the EU as a passive and so to speak en passant 
promoter of democratic governance, while what we focus on is the character 
and values embedded in ‘normal’, everyday, and routinized interactions 
between the EU and extra-European actors in policy areas other than democ-
racy/governance – including those discussed by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig. 
In line with thinking around practices, such interactions are based on habits, 
but while they offer continuity, they do not preclude conscious agency.
Elena A. Korosteleva’s research comes perhaps the closest to our own. 
Although she in part focuses on direct foreign aid, she explores how in 
principle technocratic instruments act ‘as a non-linear process of social 
empowerment which works with local issues on an individual level’ 
(Korosteleva, 2016, p. 680). Investigating the case of Belarus, and through 
an analysis of ‘citizens’ daily narratives’, she highlights how, through daily 
practices, individuals may “develop new knowledge of ‘good governance’ or 
simply share ‘good practices’ to become better able to solve and less tolerant 
of the existing inadequacies in their daily lives, including mismanagement, 
inequality, corruption, or abuse’ (Korosteleva, 2016, p. 688). Taking such 
budding research further, this special issue argues that democracy can be 
projected in interaction with populations in third countries – civil society, 
NGOs, political parties, women, LGBTI activists, etc. – and not necessarily only 
through the provision of democracy assistance. This relational element allows 
us to explore further how democracy may, or may not, travel across borders.
4. Overview of the special issue
In this special issue, we propose to take a different view from the classical 
democracy promotion literature, focusing on how and to what extent the EU 
projects democracy across issue areas in the Southern Mediterranean. Khakee 
and Weilandt’s contribution centres on interactions between the EU/European 
states and Moroccan/Tunisian non-state actors in two particular issue areas: 
trade negotiations and international anti-corruption policies. Both have been 
considered of crucial importance politically and economically by the EU and 
Tunisia/Morocco alike since the Arab Uprisings and the importance of implicat-
ing civil society in these areas has also been highlighted across the 
Mediterranean. The contribution thus examines, through a structured compar-
ison, to what extent Moroccan and Tunisian non-state actors are included and 
can influence policy making processes in these two policy domains. Khakee and 
Weilandt find that the EU is more likely to listen to civil society where the latter’s 
arguments are in line with EU preferences, and that there is divergence across 
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policy areas with more inclusivity on anti-corruption than on trade, and more 
timidity in the Moroccan case than in the Tunisian.
Moving to the area of gender equality, Wolff studies the EU’s processes 
and interaction with (in) direct recipients (i.e. women, civil society, state). 
Investigating the case of the Tunisian democratic transition, Wolff shows that 
the practice of EU interaction with civil society organizations (CSOs) in the 
field of gender equality has been mostly driven by the priority of trust- 
building amongst the different partners including the EU. Like Khakee and 
Weilandt in their joint article and Weilandt in his singe-authored piece, Wolff 
also comes to the conclusion that in spite of the innovation of the practice of 
tripartite dialogue, as a new venue to perform EU narratives on gender 
equality, this innovation has not led to a major change in the EU’s narrative 
and practice on gender equality which still lacks the intersectionality dimen-
sion. Yet one of the major contributions of the tripartite dialogue on gender 
has been to build trust amongst the different stakeholders (newer/older 
women organizations, the state and the EU).
Drawing upon the study of the practice turn in international relations, 
Weilandt examines the EU’s interactions with Tunisian civil society as a case 
study and the practice of regular consultations with Tunisian activists. It 
provides a textured mapping and a critical interpretation of the processes, 
mechanisms and patterns that constitute this practice. In spite of the EU 
efforts to listen to civil society during the democratic transition, Weilandt 
shows how this practice may lead to exclusionary practices by selecting 
certain partners over others. For instance, as in the case of women’s organiza-
tions for Wolff, the EU has some trouble moving beyond its comfort zone and 
tends to listen more to CSOs based in Tunis and part of the set of pre-2011 
activists. Investigating the case of the LGBTI in Lebanon, Dandashly shows 
that EU engagement beyond (modest) funding and low-key interaction is not 
always wanted or beneficial. Building on semi-structured interviews and 
engaging with secondary literature, Dandashly seeks to answer the questions: 
to what extent does the EU engage with local actors to improve minority 
rights? And how do the various EU actors engage with LGBTI rights’ CSOs in 
Lebanon in particular? His main findings show that the EU is ambiguous when 
it comes to LGBTI rights in the MENA and tend to treat the matter within 
broader a human rights context. While most initiatives come from the local 
CSO activists themselves, the EU delegation and EU member states are 
following the lead of such local actors, which, given the sensitivity of the 
issue, is appropriate.
LaGro and Cavlak look at the role expert communities play in democracy 
projection. Following a body of 205 interviews with experts from networks 
such as Euromesco or FEMISE, they demonstrate that mutual transfer of 
knowledge and norms such as pluralism and participation to policy-making, 
inclusiveness of civil society is enhanced through the cooperation amongst 
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Euro-Mediterranean expert communities. Expert networks provide socializa-
tion venues across a multitude of policy areas and could become new 
mediums to amplify democratic projection if new modalities would be put 
in place.
5. Contribution of this special issue to the scholarship
One of the main findings of this special issue is variance. Democracy projection 
is uneven across policy areas and countries. Covering a wide range of issue 
areas such as gender, LGBTI, anti-corruption, trade, research, and expert com-
munities, our contributions all point to differences in the extent of projection 
of democratic norms by the EU. This varies across a number of factors.
One factor at play is clearly perceived interest. For instance, as discussed by 
Khakee and Weilandt, the EU is much more reticent to effectively include civil 
society in a dialogue reinforcing their democratic agency where it could disrupt 
the swift conclusion of negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement in Tunisia or jeopardize the extension of the agricultural and 
fisheries agreements to Western Sahara. In contrast, they are quicker to do so in 
the case of anti-corruption initiatives in Tunisia, where EU and civil society 
interests converge.
But interest does not explain everything. Another factor is ideational: 
Pioneering Tunisia has thus definitely seen the most innovative set of con-
sultative practices which in some areas have helped to create a constructive 
environment of trust-building between the EU and different Tunisian stake-
holders during the delicate time of the democratic transition (Weilandt; 
Wolff). Thus, the EU is trying harder in a case such as the Tunisian to ensure 
that its engagement with civil society is in accordance with democratic norms 
of dialogue, inclusion, and mutuality, even if the results, as Weilandt shows, 
are sometimes mixed. Arguably, the same is true in the case of LGBTI rights in 
Lebanon. Through dialogue with civil society, the EU has concluded that it is 
best for it to stay out of the internal discussion on LGBTI rights, lest it 
jeopardizes its struggle. Instead, EU engagement has had an impact in help-
ing CSOs to speak with one voice, as explained by Dandashly in his 
contribution.
A third factor may be habit and institutional inertia. LaGro and Cavlak show 
that in relation to expert communities such as EUROMESCO, FEMISE and 
EMNES, the EU is quite receptive to dialogue and inclusion, with a mutual 
transfer of knowledge and norms. In contrast, the inability of EU institutions 
to ‘translate’ NGO concerns and suggestions (which tend to be less technical 
and not in conformity with applicable terminology and procedures) could be 
put in the column of institutional inertia (ibid).
A fourth factor is social construction (and as such cannot be dissociated 
from interests to the extent that these are socially constructed). If freer trade 
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is constructed as intrinsically good, then engaging with actors on such topics 
becomes superfluous, and even potentially counterproductive or outright 
harmful. This can explain why the European Commission has been so reluc-
tant to engage on substance in the area of trade (see Khakee and Weilandt): it 
would go against the episteme of freer trade as ultimately a good thing 
(Hannah 2016).
Interestingly, most of the contributions point to the problematic issue of 
the meaning given to norms and power asymmetries as structurally constrain-
ing progress in the field of democracy projection. In various policy areas such 
as gender or trade, the authors raise the issue of how democratic norms are 
understood by the EU. In the area of gender policies, for instance, the author 
stresses that the EU has at times an instrumental understanding of engage-
ment with women, regarding them mostly as economic resources in 
a neoliberal environment. Another issue is the ‘one-size fits all’ approach 
that prevails in many of the EU policy documents and which tend to regard 
for instance women as a single entity sharing the same problems, thus 
leading to an undifferentiated engagement. In the case of gender in Tunisia 
for instance, there is only a too fragile recognition of the intersectionality 
issues.
Thus, this special issue points to a varied picture: the EU has sometimes 
engaged in a dialogue with politically important actors beyond states in the 
Southern neighbourhood, and sometimes chosen not to, for a variety of 
reasons. Sometimes, such as in the area of LGBTI rights, it has acted sensi-
tively, while in others, such as e.g., in the area of trade in Western Sahara, it 
has not. It is our contention that this messy empirical reality is likely to evolve 
over time – while retaining its messy elements – with the EU engaging more 
democratically with some actors in the coming years, while remaining top- 
down, aloof and rhetoric in other areas. What we have not so far touched 
upon is how far democratically infused interactions (increasing process legiti-
macy) has led to increased output legitimacy. Clearly, more research is 
needed.
Notes
1. We are employing the same definition of civil society as elsewhere in this 
special issue, namely the space between the state, market, and family “where 
voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the rules [in terms of specific 
policies, more general norms, and deeper social structures] that govern one or 
the other aspect of social life. Operationally, it excludes organizations (parties) 
seeking public office or commercial profit. In practice, it includes a wide range 
of registered and non-registered organizations of different political/societal 
persuasions and goals, e.g., environmental movements, ethnic/regional lobbies, 
faith-based groups of various types, human rights NGOs, labour unions, local 
community groups, philanthropic foundations, professional bodies, think tanks/ 
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academic institutions, women’s and youth associations, etc (Scholte, 2002, p. 
283).
2. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has included the respect for democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ in bilateral trade agreements, 
including the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its predecessor, the Lomé IV 
bis Convention, which both cover EU cooperation with African, Pacific and 
Caribbean mostly former colonies, the Association Agreements with Eastern 
and Southern neighbours from Ukraine to Morocco, as well as the cooperation 
agreement with Mercosur signed in 1995.
3. The conclusion has often been that democracy support in the European neigh-
bourhood has not worked, as it has often gone hand in hand with support for 
authoritarian but stable regimes which serve Western strategic, economic, and 
political interests (Börzel, 2015; Brownlee, 2012; Schlumberger, 2006). Post-Arab 
uprisings, relatively little has changed, although there have been some lessons 
learned, including increased pragmatism, flexibility and reactivity as well as 
increased engagement with CSOs (Youngs 2014). Strategically, democracy assis-
tance has been admonished for missing out on the agents of democratic change, 
including the central role played by social networks and citizens (and not necessa-
rily CSOs) (Khondker, 2011) as well as the roots of the uprisings: socio-economic 
inequalities, the gap between centres and peripheries, and the lack of prospects for 
youth (Kamel & Huber, 2015). In general, policy effectiveness is seen as limited at 
best.
4. There are of course exceptions to this relative lack of theorization. Notably, there 
is an ongoing debate around the types of democracy promoted externally and 
what this says about the nature of democracy promotion and its role in world 
ordering (Kurki, 2013; Wetzel & Orbie, 2011). Moreover, the democracy promo-
tion literature has largely followed the long-standing general theoretical debate 
on how to understand EU foreign policy generally towards its neighbourhood 
and beyond, pitting proponents of a ‘normative power Europe’ against more 
realist/rational approaches (see e.g., Pace, 2009). There are also a number of post- 
colonial and neo-marxist analyses (Guilhot, 2005; Hanieh, 2006).
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